Are there boundaries to freedom of contract?

Contract law recognises the application of power

Does contract as we know it continue to exist? That it may not is a fairly bold proposition...greatly discussed of course since Grant Gilmore's 'The Death of Contract' in 1974. Gilmore argued that:

The most dramatic changes touching the significance of common law in modern life also came about, not through internal developments in common law, but through developments in public policy which systematically robbed contract law of its subject matter…removing from ‘contract’ transactions and situations formerly governed by it... [p6]

In August this year, a Queensland Court of Appeal decision provided evidence to support Gilmore's thesis, upholding a purchaser's right to end an otherwise valid residential land purchase. The reason? The vendor's solicitors, in sending the contract to the purchaser's solicitors, failed to draw their attention to the warning statement attached to the front page. This breached s368A(2) of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) ('PAMDA').

Does this provision, and its interpretation, really protect consumers? Or is it instead a blunt instrument that erodes all the assumptions we make about the foundations of contract law?

Sex & Immorality: The Court's Take

Early this year, the Supreme Court of New South Wales handed down its decision in Ashton v Pratt.  This was an action by Ms Ashton to enforce a promise made by Richard Pratt - director of Visy Industries and well known philanthropist.  The Court accepted (though somewhat reluctantly it seems) that Mr Pratt had told Ms Ashton that he would establish trusts of $2.5 million for each of her two children, pay her an allowance of $500,000 per year, pay up to $36,000 per annum for rental accommodation for her, and pay $30,000 per annum for her business expenses, particularly travel. [para 28].

In exchange, Ms Ashton agreed not to return to the escort industry, and provide services (non-exclusively) to Mr Pratt as his mistress on occasions when he was in Sydney.

In spite of the Court finding that such a promise existed, it refused to uphold the promise.  Others have commented on the decision - eg here and here - however what interests me in particular is one basis for this refusal; that even if there were a contract, the Court would not enforce it on grounds of public policy.  The question that springs to my mind is why the law would still presume to find an apparently consensual sexual relationship - for money or otherwise - immoral to such an extent that it fell foul of 'public policy'.